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REPLY ARGUMENT 
The State has suggested the primary issue in this case be re-phrased, apparently to 
emphasize whether the Appellant established any error committed by the Court when it 
suspended M. Wagner's driver's license. 
The State has premised its analysis upon the belief Appellant "refused to submit" to 
a test "required" by Deputy Hale. Is it being suggested it is an established "fact" he ''refused 
a test" or is it being offered as a "Conclusion of Law" he refused a test, or is it based on the 
concern we have no test "result" because the blood draw could not extract blood. . . 
It is critical to keep in mind, before a court can ever suspend a licensee's driver's 
license, there &be compliance wit11 the notice requirements of § 18-8002 and § 18- 
8002A, Idaho Code. See again, Beem v. State, 119 Idaho 289,805 P. 2d 495 and In The 
Matter of Vivgil, 126 Idaho 946,895 P. 2d 182 (1995). That notice must address what 
constitutes a refusal of a test. Mr. Wagner does not believe he "refused" a test, but rather 
cooperated fully with a mutual ameement he would submit to the administration of a blood 
draw, a procedure he believed the officer agreed with him would be a more accurate testing 
process to pursue. The fundamental aspects of the coilversation between the officer and this 
Appellant is recited in the Opening Brief, pages 3-5, with reference made to the transcript 
for verification of contents. If the officer thought he had a "refusal" from a licensee to 
submit to the administration of a "test", during the initial discussion about a "breath" test we 
would be forced to accept such a concept of refisal if it was the officer's choice to stop the 
inquiry, regard the situation a refusal, and end the process entirely. Clearly, that is not what 
the conversation was between the parties, or the intended result to be, as the licensee and 
officer "agreed" to cooperate in conducting the administration of an "approved testing 
process", and clearly agreed there was a request and submission to a blood draw, which was 
performed at the officer's direction, with the use of a selected technician. The licensee did 
comply with the consent Statute, not only "implied" consent, but "actual" consent, with full 
and "absolute" cooperation with a blood draw, conflmed by the officer's administration of 
the process with his instructions to the technician. 
If the officer wants to claim a "refusal" under the facts in this case, he certainly did 
not consider it such when he went from discussing breath testing to blood draw as the form 
of evidentiary testing. 
The Licensee was never advised he had "refused" a test, and also never told his 
cooperation with the officer in consenting to a blood draw would not be a cure to an earlier 
refusal of an "initial" test. There is no notification of such a consequence that his actions 
constituted a "refusal", no matter what happened or took place thereafter, under the officer's 
opportunity to proceed with the alternative testing methods. 
If this coilstitutes a "refusal", then why have the courts committed such an effort to 
address and explain what "delayed assent" is about, and that a "change of mind" within a 
period of time constitutes compliance with the Implied Consent Law. Where does 
notification and advise of rights on a refusal begin, and when does it all end, especially 
when the facts show there is a testing process being administered and fully conducted, as 
agreed, as requested, as consented to, and with 1 I 1  cooperation, despite the result no 
discernable results were generated because the technician could not get blood. No where 
does the law define "implied consent" to include recovery of test results; it merely requires 
consent, and that is demonstrated with cooperation in the performance of a testing process 
administered by an officer who has reasonable grounds to make such a request. 
In their Brief, the State has argued that State v. Cu~dis, 106 Idaho 483,489-90,680 
P. 2d 1383, 1389-1390. (Ct. App. 1984), is authority to establish the "standard" that is to be 
used in determining whether a person who has refused a blood test, is to be the standard of 
"clear error", customarily applied to factual issues, as opposed to a standard of "review for a 
waiver of a constitutional right". 
The Magistrate ruled Mr. Wagner refused the "initial" request for a breath test, so 
now nothing else matters. Is the Standard one of "clear error", or is it rather better addressed 
in the context of statutory interpretation. Whatever the "standard", the review of consent 
opens the door for what is to be said about "delayed assent", or "change of mind" within a 
reasonable period of time to take a test, and directly raises the issue about the nature and 
extent of what shall the notification requirements be to a licensee under the Statute, and 
what constitutes a "refusal" in light of a consequence of a licensee's full cooperation with 
the administration of a chemical test process that was agreed to, requested by an officer, and 
consented to by the licensee. 
We believe that had there been a test result generated in this administration process, 
there would never have been the issue of a refusal. Clearly, and at the very least, had there 
been a "forced blood draw'', with test results obtained, the Ada County Magistrate(s) would 
hold there is no refusal, as to hold otherwise, a licensee is wrongfully exposed also to an 
Administrative license suspension for a test failure, if the result was .08 or more. Such a 
concept must be viewed as mutually exclusive, when considering the fundamental purpose 
of what is sought to be achieved by the "implied consent law". Does this case rest on 
"Results"? That is not contained in the Implied Consent Statute, so it, cannot be such in the 
final analysis when seeking to interpret the meaning of compliance with the Implied 
Consent Law. Cooperation must be a major element of consent, and submission to the 
administration of a test process, with full cooperation, conducted upon the request, 
agreement and administration of an officer, & the essence of compliance with the law, and 
nowhere does it state the creation of "results" is a function or element of consent or 
compliance. The testing results is a by-product of consent, not the definition of it, and 
results may be later found worthless, as samples are at times voided, or determined invalid 
from being contaminated, or the process may have been found to have been administered 
not in conformity with the Standards or Operating Procedures. "Results" of the 
administration of the test are not the issue, and should not be made the basis for deciding 
this case. We realize, as a "procedural" matter, we would not be here challenging a court 
ordered suspension of a licensee, had there been test "results" obtained by the technician 
from extracted blood samples. But that procedural reality coifirms the "fact" there was 
complete consent to the administration of a test, and there should be no basis to claim a 
refusal under the Implied Consent Law. 
The Slate has also chosen to focus extensively on In re Gr$ths, 1 13 Idaho 364,744 
P.2d 92 (1987) and Slate v. Cummings, 118 Idaho 800, 800 P. 2d 687 (1990) as being 
"instructive" on the case of Mr. Wagner, and has presented argument to that effect in their 
Brief at pages 6-8. 
The issue in our case is whether Mr. Wagner's voluntary cooperation and 
submission to the administration of an evidentiary test, either offered to him or agreed to by 
the officer and Mr. Wagner, is sufficient to satisfy Idaho's Implied Consent Law. 
As we before said, this appeal may best be presenting a question of statutory 
interpretation, not one of "clear error" or "waiver of a constitutional right". The Court will 
exercise free review over legal questions concerning the construction and application of a 
statute. See Halen v. State, 136 Idaho. 829, 832,41 P.3d, 257,260 (2002). 
There is no statutory authority or case law that supports this Magishate's 
determination that Idaho's Implied Consent Statute applies only to the "initial" evidentiary 
test offered by an officer, but if that were the case, then there must be notification that 
subsequent testrequests or consents by a licensee are irrelevant and must be cited as such in 
the advisory form given. 
We are not here to claim a driver has any choice .as to which evidentiary test is used 
to determine the concern over blood alcohol concentration; Likewise;:there is no issue 
raised as to the discretion of the arresting officer to determinewhichevidentiary test he is 
authorized to administer, as Idaho Law says the officer will determine which evidentiary 
test he may. elect to administer. In our case, the officer has sought for good and legitimate 
reasons, the opportunity to administer a blood draw, and that is an undisputed fact. ., 
The question presented here, and one which appears not to have been previously , , 
decided by Idaho's appellate courts, is whether a driver, who freely and voluntarily submits 
to an administered alternative evidentiary test for blood alcohol content, when requested or 
agreed to by an officer, without the use of any force by the officer, has complied with 
Idaho's Implied Consent Law. 
Wc include the idea of "force" because that situation was somewhat before the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 308,160 P. 3d 739 (2007). Although the 
question in Diaz did not involve a second voluntary test, the facts underlying that decision 
do illuminate the question presented to this Court. In Diaz these was no question the driver 
"refused" to take a breath test, and the alternative blood draw was taken from him as an 
"involuntary" process, and to some degree, a use of force or at least the potential of a 
suggested force was part of the equation, as the licensee sat there and let the process be 
administered. The situation presented by this case is a blood draw that was voluntary, 
rather than involuntary concept presented in Dim. 
Our Magistrate, however, has declared, essentially, that only the "initial" evidentiary 
test requested to be administered by an officer is what determines whether a driver has 
submitted to a test under the implied consent statute; what about a forced blood draw? Is 
that a refusal or compliance? 
The decision upon which our Magistrate likely chose to rely in reaching this 
decision of "initial" test would be from aspects taken within the decision of In the Matter of 
Halen, 135 Idaho 829,41 P.3d, 257 (2000) and In the Matter of GrBths, 113 Idaho 364, 
744 P. 2d, 92 (1987). However, and as we before said, Halen and Grzflths do not readily 
appear to stand for the proposition that a driver's reluctance to take the "initial" offered 
test is the only question to consider, with respect to compliance with Idaho's Implied 
Consent Law. Those two decisions arguably stand just as favorable for the opposite 
proposition, as the case(s) suggest an officer should be allowed an "opportunity" to request 
the administration of an alternative test, and the driver's submission to that alternative 
evidentiary test should be just as effective, when administered, as if the driver had submitted 
to the initial evidentiary test. 
The distinction between the Magistrate's Decision in this case, and the rule stated in 
Halen and Grzflths, again turns on the fact it is the officer who determined the evidentiary 
test process for a blood draw would be administered, and nothing else considered, as no 
opportunity was taken by the officer to do otherwise. As stated in Halen, as cited from 
Gr~fiths, "The defendant's willingness to take another form of test penerally does not negate 
the effect of his refusal to submit to the form of test requested by the officer" 136 Idaho at 
832,41 P.36 at 260; however, Hulen, decided in 2000, quoted additional content from 
GrzBths, where the Court had also stated: 
" a fear (of needles) may establish sufficient cause for refusing to submit to a blood 
test requested pursuant to I.C. $18-8002, if the fear is of such a magnitude that as a 
practical matter the defendant is psvchologicall~ unable to submit to the test, and if 
the fear is sufficiently articulated to the police officer at the time of refusal so 
that the officer is given an opportunity to request a different test, See 113 Idaho 
364 at 372,744 P.2d, 92 at 100 (1987), See Halen, 136 Idaho, 41 P.3d at 260. 
(Underlining emphasis added). 
It would appear Hden and Gr@th expressed concern over the fact the driver did 
not demonstrate such a practical matter to the officer to sufficiently encourage the officer to 
take the "opportunity" to administer an alternative evidentiary test. In contrast, in Mr. 
Wagner's case, the testimony of the officer was that Mr. Wagner expressed his concerns, 
and of such a magnitude over his lack of faith in a breath test that the officer had the 
opportunity to understand those practical matters and offered to administer an alternate test, 
and the driver fully cooperated with that consent, identified in the transcript and again as 
reflected in the Opening Brief, all of which consent and cooperation was being done without 
any suggestion of force or any involuntariness. 
Affording an officer an "opportunity" to administer a different evidentiazy test, 
after a driver was concerned about the "initial" test seems to speak to the intent of Guapths, 
supra, and to suggest otherwise would render an officer's "opportunity" to become an 
irrelevant concept in Grzflfhs if compliance with Idaho's Implied Consent Law was 
dependent &upon the "initial" evidentiary test. The driver's voluntary submission to the 
administration of a second evidentiaty test would then become meaningless, both in the 
context of "opportunity" given to the officer, and the idea of "delayed assent", not to 
mention what then must be said to a licensee under the notification requirements. A 
different evidentiary testing process could not, or should not be pursued if it were to be 
declared all in vein by the Court, and if that be the intent of the iaw, it must be contained in 
the Advisory Form and Notification of Suspension, which obviously, it is not. What 
appears to be lost in the "shuffle" of this characterization over an "initial" or "second" 
evidentiary testing is the concern over what the public purpose is involved when the 
legislature is trying to obtain scientific information about blood alcohol levels, as declared 
by the Court of Appeals in Smith v. State, 115 Idaho 808,812,770 P.2d 817,821 
(Ct.App.1989). That concern was later adopted and modified by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Pangburn v State, 124 Idaho 139,141,857 P.2d 618,620 (1993). This public policy is 
reinforced by recognizing a driver's ri~& to render a volru~tary submission to a second or 
alterative evidentiary test is compliance with Idaho's implied consent law, after a driver has 
declined to submit to the initial evidentiary test offered by an officer. 
In the context of the facts presented in Halen and GrrfJiths, there are circumstances 
where an officer may have the o p p o ~ ~  to request the administration of a different test, - 
and may actually be required to offer a second evidentiary test. Such fact that created the 
"opportunity" was Mr. Wagner's discussion, in practical terms, he possessed a lack of faith 
in the breath testing process, and the officer recognized that genuine concern and legitimate 
and together they agreed to pursue the cooperative administration of a blood draw. When an 
officer voluntarily agrees to and offers a second evidentiary test, to which the driver has 
volunlarily agreed and completely submitted to, there is no compelling public policy to 
support the argument a driver's submission to the administration of a second evidentiary test 
upon an opportunity taken by the officer, is non-compliance with Idaho's Implied Consent 
Law. 
Consider again the recent decision in State v Diaz, 144 Idaho 308, 160 P.3d 739 
(2007). The Court appears to have given authority to a police officer, in some degree, to 
(constitutional1y)"compel" the withdrawal of blood under the police power granted in $1 8- 
8002, Idaho Code. That concept of such police power for such involuntary action is being 
upheld. If a police officer can involuntarily take blood, then in a situation where a driver 
"voluntarily" cooperates to give blood with the requested administration of a blood draw, is 
compliance. We have the presence ofthe expert medical technician who repeatedly 
penetrates the body for the specific purpose of drawing blood, with consent, and the driver 
does everything asked of him. That should not be considered a refusal under the Statute. 
We believe the Statute only requires a driver to ''submil" to the administration of an 
evidentiary test, and the law is not based on whether test samples are recoverable or valid. 
Undeniably, this driver did submit to and cooperated fully with the requested blood draw 
administration, and was agreeable to provide evidence to be determined from the test of the 
blood extracted. R e  testimony of our officer confirmed there was no need for a physical 
struggle lo address the blood draw, but emphatically demonstrated complete and total 
cooperation. Consequently, the legal authority, according to State v Diaz, 144 Idaho 230, 
and State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, is a basis to obtain a blood draw, and that comes 
only through the Implied Consent Law. Forced taking should have no greater distinction for 
consent than voluntary giving. If a driver has consented to the evidentiary draw of his blood, 
by virtue of his driver's license, under Idaho's Implied Consent Law, there could be no 
refusal. 
Once the officer selected a blood draw test, and the driver complied, there could be 
no refusal when the administration proceeds, and could be no refusal as demonstrated under 
the logic of Diaz Furthermore, as we before argued, this case could be viewed under the 
analysis of what is considered delayed assent language found within In Re Pangburn, 124 Id 
135, and In re GrifJiths, 113 Idaho 364. See also State v Bock, 80 Idaho 296, which states 
"the only way he can withdraw that consent is to expressly refuse the "test". Mr. Wagner 
expressly agreed to the administration of the blood draw. The state has not been prejudiced 
by Mr. Wagner's expression of concern over his lack of faith in the breath test, and his 
sincere comment over his concerns did give the officer the oouortunity to request the 
licensee to administer a test, which all parties agreed to, and the officer summoned the 
phlebotomist to pursue the draw. 
The State had not elected to argue it has been prejudiced under any exigency 
exemption, as was addressed in State v Woolery, 116 Idaho 368,775 P.2d 1210 (1989), as 
the opportunity to seek and to timely secure a blood draw was not lost, but rather was 
immediate and preserved. 
This driver cooperated fully, and did "submit" to the requested blood test as required - 
by $318-8002 & 18-8002A, Idaho Code, and under the scientific standard stated by the 
Court in Pangburn, the moment of any possible delay between the time the breath test was 
declined, and the time the blood draw was pursued, did not materially affect the possible 
outcome of that test. See also Smith v State, 115 Idaho 808,811,770 P.2d 817,820 (Ct. 
App. 1989) 
The statutory authority for the administration of any test is the "Implied Consent 
Statute", $ 18-8002(1), Idaho Code, and "by virtue of this statute, anyone who accepts the 
privilege for operating a motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways has consented in advance to 
submit to a BAC test. See State v Buell, 33435 (Idaho Ct. App. 1-3-2008), 175 P. 3d 216 
and In The Matter of Gr@ths, 113 Idaho 364 (1987) Implied consent to evidentiary testing 
cannot, by law, be limited to a single form of test, as the consent is already given "in 
advance", and the cooperation to participate in a blood draw is evident in this case, and 
evidentiary testing, as a matter of Idaho law, includes testing of blood, See f, 18-8002 (9), 
Idaho Code. It is the "blood alcohol content" that is the objective to be addressed in any 
testing process, and a blood draw many people believe is the most accurate means of 
determining blood alcohol content. 
We wish to emphasize our concerns that to address this case in any other manner 
than finding compliance with the Implied Consent Law has been accomplished, would serve 
only to coneont the issue whether there has been a lawful compliance with the notice 
requirements of f, 18-8002 and f, 18-80024 Idaho Code, because the statute requires 
specific and substantial notice to a licensee about all consequences, and the suspension 
advisory form as presently written does not substantially inform a licensee that should he be 
give the officer the opportunity to pursue the administratio11 of a blood tesl, and he exercises 
that opportunity to accept your cooperation with a blood draw, your license will be 
suspended nonetheless. Notice is everything in the context of the advisory form. See Beem 
v. State, 119 Idaho 289,805 P. 2d 495, see also In the Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946,895 
P. 2d 182 (1995). Not only does the advisory form fail to provide notification hat should he 
cooperate fully with the administration of a second test, elected by the officer who has taken 
such an opporlunity to pursue, that it still means nothing to the court and he is subject to 
suspension of his license. The officer has failed to tell him anythmg about such a 
consequence, and under $1 8-8002A(7e), Idaho Code, itbecomes mandatory grounds to 
vacate the suspension "ifthe person was not infonned of the c'onsequences of submitting 
to evidentiary testing as required by subsection 2 of this section." There could be no logical 
basis to say a driver is not informed of the potential of license suspensions and sanctions as 
set forth in either 518-8002 or 518-8002A, Idaho Code, if no one tells him specificaily that 
should he decline a breath test, his consent is only good if a blood draw is attempted by use 
of some "constitutional force", but his consent is no good if he cooperates fully. He must be 
told he will face an.absolute license suspension for one year if he declined the "Tnitial"test, 
despite cooperatingfdly with a blood draw, and avoided need for a "forced blood draw". 
In effect, this Licensee now faces the futility of his good faith cooperation in the . . 
administration of a l a m  pursuit of a blood draw, as authorized by the Diaz case, but his 
license is taken because they couldn't extract blood. . . . . 
Neither the actual text of either $18-8002 or 5 18-8002A, Idaho Code, nor the 
holdings in any Idaho Appellate cases, support the interpretation of such an intended result, 
. . as applied by our Magistrate, or as argued by the State, and we believe Idaho's Implied 
Consent Statute does fiot require a driver's fate to rest only upon the "initial" evidentiary test . . 
discussed, when the opportunity to pursue an alternate test is exercised and administered. 
When an officer elects to administer a test, whether it be a first, second, third, or 
whatever, and it is a test to which a licensee submits his body to the test and a qualified 
technician, then Idaho Public Policy be regarded as being served, and there is no 
applicable legal standard, be it a statute or case law, that disqualifies such good faith 
consent, cooperation, and effort.to perform a test process that is administered by an officer, 
without force, it represents the essence of what Idaho's implied consent statute was meant to 
achieve. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the magistrate must be reversed, as there is no statutoxy authority or 
case law to support a magistrate's determination that Idaho's Implied Consent Statute only 
applies to the "initial" test offered by an officer. So long as the officer elects to administer 
an alternative process to that of the first process offered, to which the driver has cooperated 
fully, and submits absoIuteIy to the subsequent process, it n~ust be held to have lawfdly 
satisfied Idaho's Implied Consent Statute, and a license can not be suspended. To rule 
otherwise would place the suspension advisory form used in this case into disqualification, 
as it did not substantially inform the driver of the consequences of such good faith, and 
complete cooperation and accord to submit: to a blood test draw. that inthe final analysis, . ,. 
...... . . 
-.. ..., was only a meaningless and irrelevant gesture ,'" 
/ ' '\ 
Dated this 8'h Day of February, 2010. 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 8' day of February, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the 
following addresses as follows: 
, . 
Lawrence G. Wasden ( X  ) U.S. Mail 
700 West State Street ( ) :Fax 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
. . 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
